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Introduction
Traditional, Nodal, and Transnational Governance Models
Traditional models of regulation and governance draw authority from the sovereign power of the state and convert that authority into an action in regulation or in governance.
1 As Morgan & Yeung outline in their classic Introduction to Law and Regulation (Morgan & Yeung 2007) traditional models of regulation and governance begin from the cybernetics principle. Such a model begins with three components of a control system: capacity for standard setting; capacity for information gathering; and capacity for behaviour modification. In essence a model for regulation or for governance is predicated upon a standard-setting authority, a monitoring 2 system which detects deviation from these standards and a form of corrective action to remedy deviation. Lawyers tend to more commonly apply a narrow definition of regulation: "At their narrowest, definitions of regulation tend to centre on deliberate attempts by the state to influence socially valuable behaviour which may have adverse side-effects by establishing, monitoring and enforcing legal rules." (Morgan & Yeung, 2007: 3) . Some, however, employ a
wider definition of what some may more properly suggest is governance: "At its broadest regulation is seen as encompassing all forms of social control, whether intentional or not, and whether imposed by the state or other social institutions." (Morgan & Yeung 2007: 3-4) The true nature of regulation and governance, as applied in the real world, is probably closer to the latter than the former, but the study of such an ill-defined sphere would be nigh-on impossible as almost any social action by any institution could be defined as a regulatory act. Thus studies of regulation and governance have developed a number of refinements and supplementary models. Many such as risk based regulation (Black, 2010) and responsive regulation (Ayres & Braithwaite 1992; Baldwin & Black 2008) are modelled upon specific relationships between an industry or sector and its regulator. They assume commonality of experience and language: in essence these approaches are institutional approaches to both regulation and governance.
Another set of models examines the social structures of regulation and governance such as libertarian paternalism and empirical regulation (Sunstein & Thaler 2003; Sunstein 2011) , and "smart" regulation (Gunningham et al 1998) . These are valuable additions to both the normative cybernetic model and the risk/responsive institutional models. They are not particularly helpful to the current analysis as their focus is on responses of the social actor in the regulatory matrix whereas the instant analysis is on technology and technological actors. Therefore, although we acknowledge the importance these contributions make to wider discourse on regulation and governance, and in particular their contribution by acknowledging the potential exploitation of biases and heuristics in human actors, we do not intend here to examine such socially mediated forms of regulation.
2 Some regulatory models do capture the role played by technology as an actor. The most relevant are applications of Actor-Network Theory or Science and Technology Studies (Latour 2005; Kuhn 1962 ). Actor-Network Theory (ANT) is often associated with Michel Callon and Bruno Latour and is closely linked to the work of the Centre de Sociologie de l'Innovation, Paris.
It was not developed particularly to deal with computer networks (Latour, 1996) but rather was designed to model the semiotic relationships between all actants in a network human or nonhuman. It can be extremely difficult to model without years of study but a good and simple description is given by Ole Hanseth and Eric Monteiro: "When going about doing your business -driving your car or writing a document using a word-processor -there are a lot of things that influence how you do it. For instance, when driving a car, you are influenced by traffic regulations; prior driving experience and the car's manoeuvring abilities, the use of a wordprocessor is influenced by earlier experience using it, the functionality of the word-processor and so forth. All of these factors are related or connected to how you act. You do not go about doing your business in a total vacuum but rather under the influence of a wide range of surrounding factors. The act you are carrying out and all of these influencing factors should be considered together. This is exactly what the term actor network accomplishes. An actor network, then, is the act linked together with all of its influencing factors (which again are linked), producing a network. An actor network consists of and links together both technical and non-technical elements. Not only the car's motor capacity, but also your driving training, influence your driving. Hence, ANT talks about the heterogeneous nature of actor networks." (Hanseth & Monteiro, 1998, 96-97) As can be seen this is a very attractive model for anyone working in the Information and Communications Technology (ICT) field including those of us working in ICT regulation or governance as it helps model the role and influence of non-human actors in the network and arguably allows for better modelling of the response of human actors to attempts to regulate their activity. ANT is in itself a subset or perhaps a development depending upon your point of view of Science and Technology Studies (STS) . This is the rather broader study of the inter-relationship between scientific discovery and advancement and external social, political and cultural influences. This covers many fields from technological determinism to modernity and deliberative democracy. Much modern structuring of STS owes a debt to the work of Thomas Kuhn and in particular his work The Structure of scientific Revolutions (Kuhn, 1962) . Kuhn posited the thesis that revolutionary changes in scientific theories may be attributed to changes in underlying intellectual paradigms. For those of us working in the ICT field it is not Kuhn's thesis itself which is particularly appealing but the question of technological determinism which also plays a vital role in STS theory and in particular the distinction between hard and soft determinism. Hard determinists see technology as a driving force in societal development. According to this view of determinism we organise ourselves to meet the needs of technology and the outcome of this organisation is beyond our control or we do not have the freedom to make a choice regarding the outcome (Ellul, 1954) .
This may be seen as an influencing factor in movements such as Cyberpaternalism. Soft determinists still subscribe to the fact that technology is a guiding force in our evolution, but would maintain that we have a chance to make decisions regarding the outcomes of a situation. This is reflected in movements such as Network Communitarianism (Murray, 2007) . A third application of STS in the ICT field is of course media determinism which was famously discussed by Marshall McLuhan in his 1964 book Understanding Media: The Extensions of Man and in which he set out the famous phrase "the medium is the message".
The application of both ANT and STS theories to ICT regulation and governance is an area already extremely well developed with excellent work available (Knill & Lehmkuhl 2002; Gutwirth et al 2008; DeNardis 2014) . Due to the already established nature of the literature in this area we do not propose to apply ANT or STS theory in this chapter; instead the tools to be applied in this analysis are to be found in nodal or decentred governance and transnational governance or regulation. Nodal or decentred governance is found in the work of Clifford Shearing (Shearing & Wood 2003 ), Peter Drahos (Burris et al 2005 and Julia Black (Black 2001) . In essence it is the acknowledgement that the regulatory environment has many more active participants than is recognised by traditional cybernetic theory. As Julia Black observes, "The decentred understanding of regulation is based on slightly different diagnoses of regulatory failure, diagnoses which are based on, and give rise to, a changed understanding of the nature of society, of government, and of the relationship between them. The first aspect is complexity.
Complexity refers both to causal complexity, and to the complexity of interactions between actors in society (or systems, if one signs up to systems theory). There is a recognition that social problems are the result of various interacting factors, not all of which may be known, the nature and relevance of which changes over time, and the interaction between which will be only imperfectly understood" (Black 2001: 106-7) . The decentring analysis must also be placed within globalisation and the transnational aspect of modern governance/regulation. Again Black acknowledges this: "Decentring is also used to describe changes occurring within government and administration: the internal fragmentation of the tasks of policy formation and implementation. Decentring is further used to express observations (and less so the normative goal) that governments are constrained in their actions, and that they are as much acted upon as they are actors. Decentring is thus part of the globalization debate on one hand, and of the debate on the developments of mezzo-levels of government (regionalism, devolution, federalism) on the other" (Black 2001: 104) The integration of decentred/nodal governance with ANT or STS theory gives a strong regulatory model for the regulation of emergent digital technologies (Teubner 2006; Koops et al 2010; Sartor 2009 (Lessig 2006: 120-37; Zittrain 2008: 11-19, 101-26) . This is most famously captured by Lawrence Lessig's model of regulation whereby he identified four regulatory modalities -law, social norms, architecture or design and markets (Lessig 2006: 122-3) . These modalities act as constraints on action or behaviour and within the plastic environment of the digital space where almost all aspects of the environment may be altered by human intervention, Lessig identifies architecture, or code, as the key modality (Lessig 2006: 83-119) . As Tim Wu observed in discussing Lessig's work: "The reason that code matters for law at all is its capability to define behavior on a mass scale. This capability can mean constraints on behavior, in which case code regulates. But it can also mean shaping behavior into legally advantageous forms" (Wu 2003: 707-8 (4)). Thus, s.230 was specifically passed to encourage IIs to play a regulatory role.
In Europe regulators undertook a nuanced approach to IIs as gatekeeper regulators. The eCommerce Directive focused energies on notice-and-takedown, imposing liability for ISPs only with attainment of actual knowledge of illegal content or activity (Art.14, Dir. 2000/31/EC). This approach has been fine-tuned through case law where courts have struggled to find a sense of proportionality that balances the rights of Internet users with litigants. In carrying out this unenviable task, courts have to balance not only rights of users against other rightsholders, within an acceptable framework for advocates of Internet freedoms that also complies with international standards.
Searching for Proportionality
Searching for 'nuance' has led to a series of cases in the UK where the courts examined various (Christensen 1997: 10-19 patent. 18 An alternative strategy is to leverage market dominance in one technology market to achieve control or dominance over an emergent market. This strategy is employed usually when 14 the dominant player in one market wishes to move into a vertically related emerging market such as Microsoft's attempts to leverage dominance in the operating systems market to achieve dominance in the web browser market or Google's attempts to leverage dominance in web search into vertical search, online advertising and mobile platforms. Unsurprisingly these attempts have drawn the attention of competition authorities in both the US and the EU and provide the perfect case study to analyse the regulatory activity of the EU directorate General for Competition as a multi-state, supranational, public regulatory body.
Microsoft: Interoperability, Media Players and Web Browsers
In the 1990s the disruptive innovation for operating system (OS) and applications software (AS) developers like Microsoft was web browsers. The risk was that anything which could be achieved through a personal computer could be achieved through a Network Computer connected to a server. (Mueller 1999) . ICANN was the conscious creation of a private multistakeholder regulator to replace the old system of public/private governance (NTIA 1998). In the years since ICANN's creation it has grown to be an effective, although controversial, multistakeholder regulator.
Despite initial criticism that it was unrepresentative (Mueller 1998; Froomkin 2001) 
Generic Top Level Domains (gTLDs) and the .xxx controversy
One policy area continually debated by ICANN and stakeholders is the creation of new gTLDs.
These are thought to be necessary due to a paucity of available addressing options in the domain name structure. The limited number of gTLDs (in 1998 when ICANN was formed there
were only three open gTLds .com, .org and .net) meant that once someone had registered say apple.com it was unavailable for anyone else. This meant once Apple Inc. had registered this address it was no longer available for Apple Records or Apple Bank (Murray 1998) . The scarcity of available domain name space meant the push for a greater number of gTLDs to alleviate pressure on the ever expanding use of the DNS is older than ICANN. In 1997 the International
Ad-Hoc Committee (part of IANA the forerunner to ICANN) proposed seven new gTLDs including .firm, .store and .web as "the DNS was lacking when it comes to representing the full scope of the organizations and individuals on the internet" (Gibbs 1997 ). These proposals were abandoned when ICANN took over management of the DNS but in November 2000, following a short public consultation, it announced seven new gTLDs of its own: .aero, .biz, .coop, .info, .museum, .name, and .pro. They were quickly criticised for being, with the exception of .biz, too narrow in reach (Levine 2005; Nicholls 2013 ) and ten years later an analysis of the .biz gTLD found it too had failed to meet its policy objectives (Halvorson et al 2012) . 
The New gTLD Process
The fallout from the .xxx case was felt acutely in the next stage of domain name liberalisation, the creation of "New gTLDs" a process formally begun in 2008. an attempt by some members of the GAC to regain control over the approval process was met head on. An attempt by the Obama administration to secure for the US and other GAC members a veto right against New gTLD applications (McCullagh 2011) was deflected by ICANN who refused to act on the proposal. Instead ICANN reaffirmed the process which had been previously agreed; a proposal which ultimately met with agreement of most members of the GAC. 33 To meet both the concerns of allowing an open registration process, which allows any string of letters or characters to be registered, and the .xxx concern, the New gTLD registration process has two safeguards. The first is that once an application is made there is a period during which objections against grant may be lodged on one of four grounds: string confusion (where the applied for name is confusingly similar to an already in use or applied for string, such as .bom or .cam); legal rights objections (where the name is confusingly similar to a legal trademark or right in a name, such as .coach or .merck); community objections (where a challenge may be brought by representatives of a community to whom the name is impliedly or implicitly addressed, such as .amazon or .patagonia); and finally and vitally for our analysis a limited public interest challenge which may be brought where the gTLD string is contrary to generally accepted legal norms of morality and public order that are recognized under principles of international law. Each objection gives rise to an arbitration process with the WIPO Arbitration and Mediation Centre dealing with legal rights objections; the International Center for Dispute
Resolution dealing with string confusion objections and the International Center of Expertise of the International Chamber of Commerce dealing with both community and public interest challenges. New gTLDs cannot be awarded until they have either passed the period for objection without any objection being lodged or the applicant has been successful at arbitration.
Any interested party with standing, including GAC members, can bring challenges. As with the .xxx case arbitration was seen as the best way to settle disputes, and as with the longstanding dispute resolution procedure, independent arbiters are preferred. The second safeguard was the creation and appointment of an "Independent Objector". This was an office created solely to Directive. Art.1(1)). Under Art.10 of the Directive, Member States are required to provide statistics relating to the retention of data generated or processed in connection with the provision of publicly available electronic communications services or a public communications network. These statistics include: the cases in which information was provided to the competent authorities in accordance with applicable national law; the time elapsed between the date on which the data were retained and the date on which the competent authority requested the transmission of the data; and the cases where requests for data could not be met. The EU responded with data retention reform plans to reduce and harmonize the data retention Civil society has also played a role in moderating legitimate actions by the state to regulate content. In 2014 the British government demanded that ISPs and mobile phone companies made a change in their choice architecture to restrict access to adult content. Access to content that is pornographic would be blocked unless a broadband user "opts in" with its provider to access such sites. Major ISPs implemented a filtering programme, marketing the programme as 'parental controls', whereby users must opt-in to a variety of content, ranging from obscene content, to content featuring nudity, drugs and alcohol, self-harm and dating sites. However, blocking systems tend not to work quite as well as was intended; filters designed to stop pornography also block sex education, sexual health and advice sites. Parental reliance on blocking can result in derogation of parental responsibility. Overreliance on a web-filtering programme often assumes that nothing is going to get through resulting in the misguided assumption by a parent that their child is safe. Civil society engaged in petitions to moderate the government's stance and to help ISPs engage with users who may be affected by their decision to change the default rule. Groups like 451 Unavailable and Blocked.org.uk have help highlight the problem of web blocking, and have encouraged courts to publish blocking orders to increase transparency. As a result of this type of advocacy, the UK courts adopted ORG's recommendations that any blocking orders should be required to have safeguards against abuse, and as a consequence adopted ORG's proposals about landing pages and "sunset clauses" as safeguards against abuse.
Conclusions
This chapter elucidates roles and relationships of non-state actors in governance of the online environment. In doing so, it examines reasons for that role and discusses the utility and legitimacy of the relationship with traditional Westphalian forms of governance. The chapter also pays some attention to the equivalent role of law, charting its interaction with non-state actors.
Its basic premise is that non-state actors play such a key part in regulation of cyberspace that the latter cannot be properly understood without explaining the frameworks in which they reside.
At the same time, we have attempted to contribute to the legal and regulatory discussion about the legitimacy of regulatory roles non-state actors play. Accordingly, there is increasing awareness of the power embedded within non-state actors and the need for on-going assessment of the balance of power between private and public bodies generally.
On another level the chapter also seeks to address the non-state actor's role in 'metaregulation' -their coordination in networks with markets and governments. The extent of the role of the non-state actors attracts critical analysis; accordingly, there is growing awareness that the regulatory regimes for Internet regulation have an inherent complexity that is difficult to comprehend. This poses significant challenges for regulators and engenders legal uncertainty, but also creates opportunities for abuses of power by non-state actors. For Teubner privatized rulemaking continues to exert "massive and unfiltered influence of private interests in law making", and is characterised as "structural corruption" (Teubner 2004: 3, 21) . For others private ordering remains the most legitimate and effective means of regulating the online environment (Post & Johnson 1996 : 1390 Easterbrook 1996) . The role of the non-State actor will continue for the foreseeable future to remain the subject of critique.
The ascendency of non-state actors is a hallmark of the online environment. The largesse of the non-state actor's conquest is perhaps most strikingly demonstrated by its invasion of cyberspace. Legal scholars will continue to examine the relationships prevalent in cyberspace, not only relationships between private corporations, but also relationships that govern relationships between government agencies and non-state actors. These apply particularly to relationships between private sector actors (in the form of business-to-business (B2B) or business-to-consumers (B2C) relationships, and secondarily, to relationships between private actors and government bodies (in the form of business-to-government). Taken together they help to embed the emergence of recent macro-regulatory terms like "nodal governance", "Internet governance" and "transnational private regulation" (Braithwaite 2008; Abbott & Sindal 2009; Calliess & Zumbansen 2010; Cafaggi 2011 ).
As we have attempted to show, ICANN is an illustration par excellence of the complexity and dynamics of a transnational private regulator. The organisation of ICANN is also intricate and difficult to decipher (Bygrave & Michaelsen 2009: 106-10) . This reflects the cornucopia of stakeholders that make up ICANN's raison d'etre and its commitment to policy-making through broad consensus. An enduring criticism of ICANN is the lack of appeal processes to another body with the power to overturn them. Although a policy proposal may emerge with broad agreement from the constituencies concerned, it is the ICANN Board's decision alone to adopt or reject the proposal. 39 Although several mechanisms exist for reviewing Board decisions, none of these create legally binding outcomes (Weber & Gunnarson 2013: 11-12) . Non-commercial user constituencies at ICANN exist solely to curb the influence of those stakeholders at ICANN that maintain considerable economic and political clout. Their function is to carve out a space for individual rights and individual registrants against excessive claims by rights-owners and governments. For example, the Non-commercial Stakeholder Group (NCSG) spent seven weeks in negotiations with other Stakeholder Groups to try to balance the rights of intellectual property owners with those of new and small businesses, other non-commercial entities, various users and the registry/registrar communities.
The NCSG is only one example of civil society's role in 'checking' more traditional power structures. Civil society is no longer just a term used to aggregate non-governmental and noncommercial entities together. Groups like Privacy International, the Open Rights Group, and the Electronic Frontier Foundation exist to ensure accountability exists on two levels: organizational accountability to the stated purpose and function of the actor, and procedural accountability to the behaviour and actions of internal management. Arguably, the increased role of civil society has come about in response to an increasing number of legal agreements falling under the 'soft law' umbrella, away from traditional statutory instruments. As a result, there is an inherent Sometimes civil society will be instrumental in pushing back against 'soft law' measures deployed by and over non-state actors. Sometimes soft law helps to shape the continuing nuances of online communication. While the Internet is said by some to be the great facilitator of freedom of expression, governments are constantly seeking to limit this right in line with the demands of their citizens; for example, passing measures to combat Internet facilitated crime unique to the modern era like cyberbullying, trolling and revenge porn. However, we find ourselves concluding that whenever regulators needed 'hard law' to exercise fine-grained control tailored to the needs of a particular platform, service, or online community, contract law is most often deployed. Statutory forms of control over non-state actors remains largely an option of 'last resort', used mostly in an indirect fashion and designed to leverage control through the structural features of either the network or the market. This is seen in our study through the activities of the EU Directorate-General for Competition in regulating the market for media players and internet browsers, and represented currently by the DG-COMP investigations into Google. Such interventions remain rare and given their complexity and costs are only exercised where all other solutions have run out. Non-state, decentred and intermediary control are likely to remain at the heart of online regulation and governance for some time to come.
1 A suitable definition of regulation is difficult given the wide range of understandings about what the term T definition offered by Philip Selznick, and subsequently refined by Juli B according to set standards, involving instruments of information-B 2002) On this understanding of regulation, law is but one means by which purposive attempts may be made to shape behaviour and social outcomes, but there may be many others, including the market, social norms and through technology itself. The term governance is if anything less well established. Again the editors suggest the adoption of governance (alongside government) as concerned with the provision and distribution of goods and services, as well as their regulation. Hence regulation is conceived as that large subset of governance that is primarily concerned with the purposive steering of the flow of events and behaviour, as opposed to providing and distributing (Braithwaite et al 2007) . The authors of this chapter are happy to adopt these definitions. 
